Imperfect Competition and the Effects of Energy Price Increases on Economic Activity by Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford
NBER WOR~G PAPER SERIES
IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND THE
EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICE








We wish to thank Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe for research assistance, IGIER for its hospitality
while we carried out some of this work and the NSF, the Sloan Foundation and the MIT Center
for Energy and Environmental Policy Research for research support. This paper is part of
NBER’s research program in Economic Fluctuations and Growth. Any opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
@ 1996 by Julio J. Rotemberg and Michael Woodford. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including O notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper 5634
June 1996
IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND THE
EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICE
INCREASES ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ABSTRACT
We show that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming that
competition is imperfect makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real
wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Plausibly parametrized models of this type are
able to mimic the response of output and real wages in the United States. The responses are
particularly consistent with a model of implicit collusion where markups depend positively on
the ratio of the expected present value of future profits to the current level of output.
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and NBERMany authors have observed that changes in the prim of oil on world markets appear
to have a significant effect on economic activity. Rasche and Tatom (1981), Darby (1982),
Hamilton (1983, 1995), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Mork
(1989), Carruth, Hooker and Oswald (1995), and others argue that oil prim shocks were re-
sponsible for substantial aggregate fluctuations in recent decades. In spite of this voluminous
empirical hterature suggesting that oil prim shocks have an important effect on emnornic
activity, there is little consensus on the re=n why this is so.
It is easily argued that an exogenous increase in the cost of a factor of production should
reduce the quantity of final output that firms will choose to supply. What is less obvious is
that the effect should be significant, if the factor of production in question accounts for only
a small part of the total marginal mst of production, as is true of energy rests. Ind&d, we
present below a numerical estimate of the predicted effect of an increase in energy pric= in a
‘calibrated” onesector stoch=tic growth model, and show that while the oil price increase is,
predicted to mntr=t output, the effect is only about a’ fifth the six of the response that we
estimate using U.S. data. A ten percent innovation in the price of oil is predicted to contract
private sector output by about one-half a percent~ our estimat= indicate instead that such ,,. ....6,,
an innovation h= on average been associated with an output decline of 2.5 percent, five or”
six quarters after the innovation.
The observed effects of oil shocks are even more puzzling when the effects on real wages
me considered - well. In standard growth models, the predicted contraction of the supply
of output is greater the less real wages fall in response to the shock, and is greatest if real
wage actually incre=e (perhaps because the product wage rises relative to the consumption
wage). Thus high real wages play a crucial role in explanations like that of Bruno and Sachs
(1985) of the effects of the oil shocks of the 1970’s. Yet, like Bohi (1989) and Keane and
Prasad (1991), we find that oil shocks typically reduce real wages. Our estimates suggest
real wages fall by nearly one percent (again, five or six quarters after the innovation) for each
ten percent innovation in oil prices. This is again nearly five times as large an effect as our
calibrated growth model would predict. But more to the point, variations in the specification
2of labor supply behavior (a point on which our model is obviously open to criticism) that
would improve the model’s ability to account for a sharp output decline (by predicting a
greater degrm of ‘real wage resistance”) would result in even less ability to account for the
observed decline in real wag=, and vice versa. This sugg=ts that it is the growth model’s
simple specification of output supply that must be rejected, rather than its model of labor
supply behavior. ‘
The alternative that we explore in this paper mntinues to =sume a simple aggregative
model of output supply, but drops the assumption that firms produce for a perfectly compet-
itive product market. Instead, we consider the effects of several simple models of imperfect
competition in the product market, introduced in our previous papers (1991, 1992, 1995).
We find that allowing for a modest degree of imperfect competition significantly increases the
predicted effects of an energy price increase on both output and real wages. In particular, we
show that a model involving implicit collusion betw=n oligopolists can auount for declines
in both output and real wages of the magnitude that we =timate.
This study complements our previous work on the effects of innovations in military pur-
chases on output and real wages (1992). As in that study, we are interested in the effects
of oil price changm not simply because they appear to have been an important source of
aggregate fluctuations in the U.S. in rewnt decades, but above all because variations in oil
prices represent a particularly good example of an exogenous shock that can be directly
identified in the data. As Hamilton (1985) h= argued, there is little reason to believe that
changes in the price of oil represent responses to U.S. economic conditions, and in particular
little reuon to believe that they should be correlated with changes in the U.S. production
technology. Indeed, this h= led authors such as Mmey (1991) and Hall (1988, 1990) to use
oil price changes as demand-shock instruments for other purposes. We follow them in this
identifying assumption.
We proceed as follows. In section 1, we estimate the responses of private sector output
lIn particular, we do not believe that simply replacing the neoclassical labor supply curve by an efficiency
wage schedule, aa propoeed by C~ruth, Hooker and Oswald (1995), would significantly improve upon the
predictions of the neoclassical g:owth model.
3and real wages to oil price increases. This section provides the facts that we then seek to
explain. Section 2 gives an intuitive discussion of why the existence of imperfect mmpetition
accentuat~ the reductions in output and real wages. Section 3 presents the class of aggrega-
tive intertemporal general equilibrium models that we analyze numerical y. We show that
a single specification allows us to nest = special cases a model with perfectly competitive
product markets (closely related to the model of Kim and Loungani (1992)), a model with
monopolist ically competitive product markets, a model with U customer markets~ in the style
of Phelps and Winter (1970), and a model with implicit collusion in the style of our (1992)
paper. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the models. Section 5 compares the numeri-
cal r=ponses of output and real wages implied by our various models with the estimated
responses from section 1. Section 6 concludes.
1 The Observed Effects of Energy Price Shocks
In this section we discuss our =timates of the effects on the U.S. economy of a shock to world
oil prices. In the models we discuss below, the variable that matters for the determination
of output and real wages is the reai price of energy, rather than the level of nominal energy
prices. Thus it might seem that we should simply seek to identify the effects of innovations
in the real price of energy. But this method would not identify a shock that we can plausibly
treat as exogenous with respect to other shocks to the U.S. economy.
mat is more plausibly exogenous in the period we study is the nominal prim of energy.
The reasons for this, u explaind in Hamilton (1985), have to do with the institutions that
set oil prices in this period. As he documents, the nominal U.S. price of oil in the pre-
OPEC period w- set to a large degree by the Tex= Wlroad Commission (TRC). The TRC
tended to keep the nominal price constant (and allowed the quantity produmd to fluctuate
so demand would be met) unless a large exogenous disturbance occurred. Thus, the nominal
pria was changed in 1952 as a result of the Iranian nationalization of oil assets, in 1956
as a r-ult of the Suez crisis and so on. The policy of keeping the dollar price of oil fixed
betw=n major realignments (that coincided with exogenous disturbanm) wu maintained in
4,
the OPEC era. Indeed, Hamilton (1985) quotes Kuwait’s oil minister M saying the nominal
oil prim “should be fromn so that the real price (adjusted for inflation) ... would fall for two
or three years”. As a r=ult of this policy the two major changes in nominal oil pric= in this
era were the 1973 oil embargo in response to the Arab-lsrmli war and the 1979 increme in
response to the Iranian revolution.
The policy of kmping the nominal oil price nearly constant between major realignments
caused by exogenous events means that innovations in the real price of oil can also be due
to unforecatable changes in U.S. inflation. These innovations in U.S. inflation need not be
exogenous with respect to U.S. technology shocks, taste shocks, and the like. We therefore
consider the bivariate stoch=tic process for nominal oil prices and a nominal price index for
the U.S., and orthogonalize the two innovations by assuming that the shock of interest to
us may affect both nominal oil prices and U.S. inflation, but that the orthogonal shock has
no eflect on nominal oil pn”ces within the quarter. Thus, it is the innovation in the nominal
oil price that actually identifies the exogenous shock that we are inter= ted in. But it is
only the effect of this shock on the forecasted path of the mal oil price that matters for the
predictions of our theoretical models about the effects of the shock.
This identifying =sumption is not equally defensible over the entire period for which we
have data. We believe that it makes sense for both the pre-OPEC and the OPEC periods.
But sometime in the early 1980’s, OPEC lost its ability to keep the nominal price of oil
relatively stable. It is reasonable to assume that after this point variations in the demand




nominal oil prices immediately. Indeed, simple examination of the time series
oil prims suggests that these prices are no longer formed in the same way in the
instance, quarters with nominal oil prims the same as in the previous quarter
no longer occur. Furthermore, the growth rate of nominal oil prices is much more rapidly
mean-reverting in this period than it had bmn previously.
The question is then when the period of exogenous nominal oil price changes ends and
that of endogenous nominal oil price changes begins. Many observers agree that OPEC lost
5much of its power to raise pric= in the 1980’s but the exact date of the break in OPEC’s hold
over the oil market is much more controversial. We approach this question by observing that
the stochastic process for nominal oil prices is quite different in the 80’s than in the earlier
period, and supposing that the proper date at which to truncate our sample is the date at
which this univariate promss changes. As is standard in the literature (see Andrews 1993)
we suppose that the most likely date of such a regime change is the point which maximizes
the F-statistic for a break in regime. We thus consider a regression that explains the current
quarterly percentage change in the nominal price of oil with a constant and two lags of
the dependent variable. We use the producer price index for crude petroleum products as
our nominal price of oil and our dependent variable runs from the fourth quarter of 1947
until the swond quarter of 1989. The maximal F-statistic for a break equals 5.92 and arises
when the first part of the sample includes only data until the third quarter of 1980. 2 The
likelihood ratio for a sample break at the beginning of the OPEC regime is much smaller.
The likelihood that the break occurred in 1986 when the Saudis retaliated against prim
chiseling by severely lowering their price is larger but still lower than the likelihood that
it occurred in 1980:3. We thus use this u our break point and only consider the effect of
nominal oil price changes before this date.
Analysis of the time series for nominal oil prices and the U.S. price level indicates that
both series are stationary only in first differences. However their ratio, the real prim of oil,
appears to be stationary SG that the series are cointegrated. We thus estimate a bivariate
vector autoregression for the two stationary series, the growth rate of nominal oil prices and
the logarithm of the real price of oil. The first of our two equations mak~ the current change
in the logarithm of the dollar price of oil (~E~) a function of a constant, a time trend, and
lags of this change = well = lags of the logarithm of the real price of oil (p~t), defined as
the price of oil deflated by the U.S. private value added deflator. The second makes the
2Under the null hypoth=ia of no breakl this is distributed according to the F-dhLribution with 161 and
3 degr= of freedom and is thus significant at a critical level of less than 1 per thousaud (the critical tiue
at the 1% level is 3.9). This critical level understates the size of the test because we have chosen the point
where the F-statistic is mbmd. Indeed, the value of this statistic is below the 10% critical value tabul~d
in Andrews (1993).
6logarithm of our real price of oil (p~t) a function of a constant, a time trend, and lags of this
variable as well w current. and lagged values of ~E:. The current value of ~E~ is included
so that the two innovations are orthogonal by construction. We truncated the lags in both
equations when the next lag had a t-statistic below one. The estimated coefficients for these
two equations are given in the first two columns of Table 1.
Treating the innovations in the first of these variables as our exogenous shock, we can
combine these equations to obtain the impulse response of the real price of oil. This impulse
response is plotted in Figure la together with confidence intervals of plus and minus two times
the standard error. 3 The U.S. general price level responds very little to contemporanmus
incre== in the nominal price of oil so that the increase in the real price of oil is almost as
large as the innovation in the nominal oil price (.98 percent for each one percent innovation
in the growth rate of nominal oil prices). The real price of oil continues to rise after this point
because the nominal price of oil tends to rise further. The peak real oil price occurs after 5-7
quarters (about 1.6 percent higher for each one percent initial innovation in the nominal oil
prim). Then, M the higher real price of oil leads the general price level to increase by more
than average and leads nominal oil pric~ to grow by less than average, the real price of oil
returns gradually to its unconditional expected value.
We also analyze the effects of this type of shock on output and the real wage. We
measure the first by the real value added produced by the private sector which we compute
by subtr~ting government value added from total GNP. Our private value added deflator is
then the ratio of nominal to real private value added. Our real wage is computed by dividing
hourly earnings in manufacturing by the private value added deflator. We focus on private
value added rather than total GNP because our theories of pricing and production decisions
(whether competitive or imperfmtly competitive) do not apply to the government. 4 We
run separate regressions explaining the logarithm of each of these two variables with two
lags of the dependent variable, a time trend, the current value as well = lags of ~E~, and
3The stmdard errors are calculated using the procedure of Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986).
4We would prefer to eliminate the U.S. oil industry as well, but we lack these data.
7lags of the logarithm of pE:. 5 The results using data from 1948:2 to 1980:3 are given in
the second two mlumns of Table 1. Once again, we truncated the lags so that the final lag
has a t-statistic greater than one. Combining the regressions in the first two columns with
these latter regr-sions we obtain the impulse responses for the output and the real wage.
These are displayed in Figures 1b and lc, again with confidenm bands of plus or minus two
standard errors.
Figure lb displays the response of real private value added. One observes that private
output does indeed decline following a positive innovation in oil prices. A one percent
increase in oil prims results in a reduction in output of about -.25 percent after 5-7 quarters.
6 One interesting feature of this decline is that output is lower in the second year following
the innovation than in the first (which is also when real oil prices reach their peak). Indeed,
the decline is statistically significant only from quarter 3 onward. 7
Figure lC shows the effect on the real wage. This too declines following an increase in oil
prims. Once again, the maximum decline occurs only in the second year (when it is nearly
-.10 percent for each one percent increase in oil prices), although in this case the decline is
statistically significant even during the first year. 8
As noted in the introduction, the simultaneous observation of sharp declines in both
output and real wages is hard to explain within the context of an aggregative competitive
model. To clarify this, we first discuss a stripped-down model based on Gordon (1984).
Then we turn to a more elaborate set of models and compare their quantitative predictions
‘An alternative ia to analyze the effect of changes in the nominal price of oil in a VAR consisting of
changes in the nominal oil price, the real price of oil, output and the real wage. We considered such a VAR
as well and obtained results that are essentially identical to those in the text. We report results based on
the regr-ions because the fact that they contain fewer nuisance parameters mak= the estimata and their
standard errora easier to interpret and, perhaps, more reliable.
‘In regressions that are not reported we also analyzed the response of hours worked in the private sector
and of the unemployment rate. Oil price increases lead hours to fall and unemployment to rise aa can be
expected from the fall in output. The increase in unemployment, as usual, lags behind the falls in output.
‘Carruth Hooker, and Oswald (1995) similarly find that the effects of an oil price shock on unemployment
are greateat after 7-8 quarters.
‘Because this is the empirical finding of greatest significance for our analysis, we checked its robustn=
in several ways. We reran the regr~ions dropping the 1974 observations and we also considered separate
regression for the pre- and post-1974 subsamples. All of these regressions reproduced the negative effect of
nominal oil prices on the real wage though the standard errors were larger because IMS data were included.
8to those of Figure 1.
2 Oil Price Shocks and Labor Demand: The Role of
Imperfect Competition
For purposes of this illustration, we first consider the extremely simplified production struc-
ture of Gordon (1984) which abstracts from capital and materials inputs. We consider an
emnomy
combines
with many symmetric firms and a fixed supply of capital. Emh of these firms
labor and energy to produce output using the following production function
K = Q(v(~t),~t) (1)
where Ht, Et and Yt represent each firm’s labor input, energy input and output respectively.
We assume that both the V and the Q functions are increasing in their arguments. We
introduce the V function because we wish to view V w value added, which is produced with
labor and capital. The introduction of the V function also allows us to assume that Q is
homogenmus of degrm one in its two arguments, while diminishing returns (due to the fixity
of capital) are represented solely by the strict concavity of V.
Choice of the inputs E and H so as to minimize costs of production in each period implies
that, at each time t, there exists a value pl such that
Q~(v(~~), ~~) = PtpEt (2)
Qv(V(~t), ~~)v~(~t) = ptwt (3)
where pE~ and wt denote the prices of energy and labor inputs respectively, each deflated
by the price of the output good. The quantity pt represents the inverse of the Lagrange
multiplier ~sociated with the requirement that the firm produce a given level of output. It
also denotes the ratio of the price of the output good to its marginal cost of production.
Thus, in the case of perfect competition, these conditions must hold in equilibrium with
pt = 1 at all times.
the extent to which
Followi~g Gordon (1984), we hold hours worked constant and we study








where SE denotes the share of energy costs in the value of total output, pEE/Q, CEVdenotes
the elasticity of substitution between energy inputs and value added V, and A denotes the
logarithmic derivative (i.e., AX is the derivative of log X). These equations imply that
AWl = – ‘E APEt,
l–sE
Ax = – ‘E tEvAPEt.
l–sE
As Gordon (1984) argues, the elasticity of substitution of energy for value added, ~Ev,
must be less than one. Otherwise, the model would be inconsistent with the rise in the share
of energy as a fraction of total costs that follows increases in energy prices. The percentage
declin~ in both output and the real wage deflated by the price of output must thus be smaller
than the ratio of energy costs to value added (SE/l – sE) times the percentage increase in
energy prices. In the U.S., the ratio of energy costs to value added is about 0.04, so that
the decline in both quantiti~ must be quite small. 9 While it is possible to obtain larger
declines in output if employment falls, such reductions in employment would require that
the real wage fall by even l~s than is indicated by the above calculation. Thus one cannot
obtain substantial declines in both output and real wages.
In f~t, such real wage declines u it k possible to obtain in this model occur only when
one deflates by the price of gross output rather than a value-added deflator. It is useful to
define the value-added price deflator
_ Yi – pEtEt
‘v’ = K(H,) .
(4)
‘See section 4 for further discussion of the size of Lhia parameter,
10In the case where the Q function takes the Leontieff form, this corresponds to the standard
GDP deflator. For other production functions the two do not coincide, but pvt is an “ideal”
(Divisia) valu~added deflator. In the case of perfect competition, (2)-(4) can be combined
to yield
v~(H,) = ~ (5)
pvt
Thus, in terms of the valu~added-deflated real wage, we obtain a labor demand curve that
is invariant with respect to changes in the prim of energy. This means that the competitive
model can account for a fall in output and employment onfy if the real wage in terms of
value added rises. 10
This labor demand curve provides a useful point of view from which to see why allowanm
for imperfect competition matters. When pt differs from 1, equations (2)-(4) yield instead
(6)
where $Et is the time t energy share, pEt~t/Qt. Equation (6) gives two reasons for the value
added-deflated real wage associated with a given level of employment to decline when energy
prices rise. The first is that this real wage would fall if the increase in energy prices led to
an increase in the markup pl. The semnd is that, even with a fixed markup, the term in
square brwkets will rise as long as the energy share sEt rises and the markup exceeds one.
In particular, holding the rriarkup and employment constant, we obtain
A(wt/pvt) =
-(p - 1)
(1 - sE)(l - ~sE)AsE’
(7)
As long as the elasticity of substitution ~Ev <1, the share of energy sE~rises with an increwe
in the price of energy, so that the real wage declines. Moreover, the required percentage
decline is bigger, the larger is the markup.
The intuition for this result is clearest in the case where there is a fixed amount of
energy needed to produce each unit of final good. Suppose that, initially, the production of
10Thusan ener~ price incre& is not equivalent to an adverse technology shock, which would shift this
labor demand curve. Energy price incre-s are treated as equivalent in the standard textbook view.
11a product requires one dollars’ worth of energy and that the price of energy inputs rises by
20 percent. Perfectly competitive firms would be willing to keep their employment mnstant
with a mnstant nominal wage as long a their output prices rise by 20 cents. Such an increase
in prices would keep the value-added deflator constant. Imperfectly competitive firms whose
employment stayed constant would raise their price by more because they mark up their
entire marginal cost. With a markup of 1.5, the 20 wnt incre~e in their unit costs leads
them to raise their prices by 30 cents. Thus, the value-added-deflated wage of these firms
must fall if they are to keep their employment constant.
3 A Dynamic General Equilibrium Simulation Model
We now consider a more general production function and construct a general equilibrium
model that, except for considering imperfect competition, is similar to those analymd by
Kim and Loungani (1992) and Finn (1991), =pecially the former. In particular, we follow
the real business cycle literature in ~suming that mnsumption and labor supply decisions
are made by a representative household.
We consider an economy with many symmetric firms. Each firm has a production function
of the general form
K = Q(W, G(E,, M,)) (8)
where ~, Et and M~ repr=ent each firm’s gross output, energy input and materials input
respectively, and Vt is an index of primary inputs (capital and labor) that represents an ideal
index of value added. Both aggregator functions Q and G are assumed to be homogenmus
degree one, incre~ing in their arguments, and concave. This specification generalizes that of
Bruno and Sachs (1985) to allow for materials costs. The separate inclusion of materials has
an important quantitative effect on our results when markets are imperfectly competitive
because of the ‘double marginalization” distortion that arises when intermediate inputs are
not priced at marginal cost. 11
1’See R,ot.emberg and Woodford (1995) and Basu (1995) for further discussion.
12The value-added index is ~sumed to be given by
Here Kt repr~ents capital inputs, Ht represents hours, Zt is an index of labor augmenting
technical progress, and @t represents fixed costs of production. Both Zt and Ot are exogenous
parameters from the point of view of the firm. We assume a deterministic time trend in Zt
in order to acmunt for the observed trend growth in per capita U.S. output. In each of
our imperfectly competitive models, we assume a positive value for @c, so that the model
reproduces the apparent absence of significant pure profits in U.S. industry despite the
presenm of market power. A time trend is allowed for the fixed costs as well, so that we can
have a steady state equilibrium growth path in which the share of fixed costs in total costs
is constant over time.
Choice of the inputs E, M, and H so M to minimize costs of
(given the capital stock and the quantity produced) then implies
exists a markup pi such that
QG(~, G(~t,~t))GE(~t, Mt) = ~i~Et
QG(utG(~t, ~t))GM(~t, ~t) = PtPMt
production in each period
that, at each time t, there
(lo)
(11)
ztQv(Vf, G(Et, Mt))F~(Kt, ztHt) = ptwt (12)
where pEt, pM~, and Wt denote the prices of energy, materials and labor inputs respectively,
emh deflated by the price of the output good. In our symmetric equilibrium, we set the prim
PMt equal to one at alltimes because each firm’s materials are the output goods of other
firms.
The economy also contains a
repr=entative household seeks to






a constant positive discount factor, Nt denotes the number of members
period t, Ct denotes total consumption by the household in period t, and
hours worked by members of the household in period t. By normalizing
the number of households at one, we can use Nt also to represent the total population, Ct
to denote aggregate consumption, and so on. The trend growth of Nt is another source of
long-run growth in our model. We ~sume, as usual, that U is a mncave function, increasing
in its first argument, and decre=ing in its semnd argument.
The additively separable preference specification (13) impli= that consumption demand
and labor supply by the household are given by time-invariant Frisch demand and supply
curves of the form
c,
— = C(w,, At)
Nt
H,
— = H(wt, At)
Nt
12 In terms of the Frisch demand where At denotes the marginal utility of wealth in period t.
functions the conditions for market clearing in the labor market and the product market
respectively can be written as
Ht = NtH(wt, At) (14)
NtC(wt, At) + [Kt+l –(1–6)I{,]+G, =K-M, (15)
where 6 is the constant rate of depreciation of the capital stock, satisfying O <6 s 1, and G:
denotes government purchases of produced non-energy goods. Equation (15) is the stmdard
GNP accounting identity, except that we do not munt value added by the government
sector or by the domestic oil industry u part of either Gt or Yt. Note that we assume that
the materials used in each firm’s production come out of other firms’ production: a single
produced good is both an intermediate good (materials) and a final good (consumption,
inv=tment, and government purch~es). 13
12 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) for further discussion.
13T0be more precise, we assume that there are many differentiated goods (and services), but comider
only a symmetric equilibrium in which each is produced in the same quantity and sold for the same price.
In such a setup there is no problem in assuming that firms must purch~e other firms’ products to use in
14Equations (14) and (15) assume that there arenor=ource costs associated with energy
production. No hours or final output must be devoted to the energy sector. Thus, equation
(15) ~sumes implicitly that energy is freely available at no cost to the oligopolistic firms
that sell it; the exogenous variations in pE~
they succeed in colluding to keep the price of
modeled), The rents earned by the producers
represent variations in the degree to which
energy high (here taken M given rather than
of energy are distributed to the shareholders
of their firms, which is to say to the representative household. 14
Finally, voluntary accumulation of physical capital (or claims to it) by households requires
that
1 = PE,{(*) [




To complete the model, we need only discuss the determination of the markup pt that
appears in equations (10)-(12). ln the case of perfect competition, pt = 1 at all times. If
firms have market power in their product markets, ~i can exceed one. The three imperfectly




(1991, 1995). The first, which is based on monopolistic competition and
of homothetic t~tes over bundl= of differentiated goods, r-ults in a
greater than one. This markup depends upon the elasticity of substitu-
tion among the differentiated goods and the homothetiticity of preferenc= implies that this
elasticity is always the same in a symmetric equilibrium.
We also show in titemberg and Woodford (1991 ) that two quite different types of models
with varying markups imply that dmired markups depend only on the ratio of Xt to Yt where
Xt is the present discounted value of profits gross of fixed costs. Thus both models imply
their own production, even though these intermediate goods are sold for a price higher than their marginal
production cat.
14This specification haa the benefit of great simplicity even if it is not M realistic as one would wish. We
obtained essentially identical results when we followed Kim and Loungani (1992) and replaced (15) by an
equation that made Y1 - Mt - p~tEi equal to N, C(w~, ~t ) + [Ki+l - (1 – 6)K,] + G,. In this alternative
specification, one deducts the ccet of energy from Y( – Ml before one obtains the output available for




The parameter a in (18) measures the rate at which new products are created as well as the
probability that any mllusive agrmment or stock of loyal customers will survive until the
next period. Its role is discussed at length in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
According to the customer market model of Phelps and Winter (1970), the function p is
decreasing in its argument The reason is that firms in the customer market model set prices
by trading off the benefit from exploiting existing customers (whose elasticity of demand is
very low) with the benefit from expanding their customer base by attracting new customers
(whose elasticity of demand is higher). Expanding the customer base is attractive because
these customers will, at a later date, have low elasticities of demand. Thought of in this way,
it is apparent that such firms will set high prices when demand by current customers is high
relative to the demand that can be expected by future customers. Also, prices will be low
if the profits from future sales are more valuable because interest rates are low. Thus, high
values of X/Y which repr~nt either high sales in the future, low interest rates or low sales
today, lead to low markups.
By contrwt, the function p is increasing in its argument in the implicit collusion model
of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). In this model, the
markup is set at the highest level consistent with having no firm deviate from the collusive
understanding. The deviations are prevented by the threat that they will be followed by
periods of very low profitability (price wars). The most effective of these punishments (and
also the simplest to analyze) is such that, starting the period after the deviation, the present
discounted value of profits is mro. This means that a deviating firm gives up Xt. On
the other hand, deviations are more attractive in the present period when sales are higher
(because a deviating firm captura more sales from its competitors) and when the markup is
higher (because this means that there are more profits to obtain by undercutting the going
16price slightly). Thus, high values of Xt/ Yt
values of pt and still avoid deviations.
To summarize, four thmries of markup
imply that the firms can afford to have higher
determination can be subsumed by (17). The
first two theori~ simply assume that p(X/ Y) is a constant function. A rational expectations
equilibrium is then a set of stochastic processes for the endogenous variabl~ {Y~, Vt, Kt, Ht,
Et, ~t, Wt, pt, Xt, At} that satisfy (8)-(12) and (14)-(18), given the exogenous processes
{pEt,
4
Gt, Zt, Nt, @t}.
Calibration of Model Parameter Values
In the next section we report the predicted responses of output and real wages to small
changes in pE~, in both the competitive and imperfectly competitive versions of the model
just described. We analyze the response to shocks by log-linearizing the equilibrium con-
ditions derived in the previous section, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1995), The
coefficients of the log-linearized equilibrium conditions involve various parameters, many of
which are standard from real business cycle models, but others of which arise only because
of our explicit treatment of energy and materials, or because of our allowance for imperfect
competition and incre~ing returns. We ‘calibrate~ these parameter values to be consistent
with various measured features of the U.S. economy, Finally, the simulations depend on
specifying thmretical constructs that correspond to our empirical me~ures of output and
the real wage. We deal with thee issues in turn.
We ensure that the equilibrium involves stationary fluctuations in suitably resealed state
variables, despite trend growth of population and productivity, by making certain additional
homogeneity assumptions. First, we assume that the representative household’s preferences
imply that there exists a u >0 such that H(w, A) is homogeneous of degree zero in (w, J%),
and that C(w, ~) is homogeneous of degree one in (w, A%). 15 Second, we assume that
the exogenous forcing variables {Gt/z~N~ }, {@t/ztN~ } {Nt+l /Nt }, {zt+l/z~ } and {pE~} are
each stationary, even tbough { Zt} and {Nt } are only difference-stationary. Given these
15Thefamilyof utility functions u with this property is discussedin King, Plosser and Wbelo (1988).
17~sumptions, our equilibrium conditions can all be written, in a time-invariant form, in
terms of suitably detrended endogenous variables, such = it ~ ~, and thus admit a
stationary solution in terms of the detrended variables.
The economy’s steady state growth path is a set of constant values for the detrended
variables (~t, etc.) that satisfy the transformed equilibrium conditions in all periods. We
do not need to solve the equations for these steady state values, as we are not interested in
explaining them in terms of more fundamental determinants, and indmd we do not bother
to specify the global properties of the utility and production functions, that determine these
steady state values. Our conmrn is rather with the model’s predictions regarding the m-
movements of the percentage deviations of the detrended variables from their steady state
growth path; we intend to compare these predictions with the observed percentage deviations
of the corresponding variables from their trend growth paths, as reported in section 1. The
numerical value =sumed for the mefficients of the linearized equilibrium conditions (written
in terms of percentage deviations of the various detrended state variables from their steady-
state values) are crucial for this. These mefficients are all functions of various shares and
elasticities, evaluated at the steady-state values of the detrended state variables.
The coefficients of the log-linearized conditions are all functions of the model parameters
listed in Table 2. We first discuss the parameters relating to the production function. The
only properties of the function G that matter for the log-linearized equilibrium conditions
are the steady-state value oi sE/sM, where SE and SM denote the respective shares of energy
and materials in the value of gross output, and CEM, the elasticity of substitution between
energy and materials inputs, also evaluated at the steady-state factor mix. Similarly, the
only relevant properties of the functions F and Q are summarized by the steady-state values
of four more parameters: the ratio of labor rests to capital costs, the ratio of intermediate
input rests to the cost of value added, and the two elasticities of substitution CKH and EVG.
The log-linearization of the transformed (9) involves coefficients that depend also upon
the steady state value of @/V, the ratio of fixed costs to value added. Hence this ratio is
another parameter that rn~st be given a numerical value; it indicates the degree to which
18there are increasing returns in the production of value added. As in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), which we follow in the calibration of several parameters, we assume that this ratio




where p denote the ratio of price to marginal cost in steady state. As a result, the ratio @/V
is not listed among the parameters that must be fixed independently in Table 2. Equation
(19) also implies that the steady-state shares of the various factor costs in the value of gross
product are equal to their share in total costs. Thus the share ratios just referred to are
all derivable from the shares 3H, SK, sE, and sM listed in Table 2, and the latter quantities
reprment only three independent parameters, as they must sum to 1.
We assign numerical values to the six independent production function parameters as
follows. In the U.S., the value of oil inputs is at most 4 percent of total value added. Value
added in the mining of oil amounts to 1.870 of GDP on average. Imports of crude petroleum,
mineral fuels, and lubricants are another 1.670 on average. Thus the value of oil inputs
is about 3.4% of total value added. Even if one counts other energy inputs that might
be thought to be close substitutes for oil (so that their prices increase to a similar extent,
relative to other goods, when oil prices increase), the figure does not become much larger;
for example, mining of coal amounts to only 0.4% of GDP. Hence sE/(l – 9E – 9M) should
equal approximately .04.
Next, we asume that materials constitute 50% of costs. This is less than the 60% share
indicated by the Berndt and Wood (1979) data for the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have
used a slightly lower number on the grounds that many service sector industries appear to
have lower materialg requirements. Thus we set sM equal to 0.5 and SE equal to 0.02. It
follows that materials and energy, together, account for 52% of costs. We then obtain the
labor and capital shares by assuming, M in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), that labor
16Thia is presumably ensured by entry decisions over the long run, not explicitly modeled on the assumption
that they are of little importance for short-run dynamics. Note that it requires that fixed costs grow at the
same trend rate as output, pr~umdly thmu~ an incre~ in the number of firma at a constant scale of
operation. See Wternberg and Woodford (1995) for further discussion.
19accounts for 7570 of value added. Thus sH and SK are set equal to 0.36 and 0.12 respectively
We follow the real business cycle literature in ~suming that the elasticity of substitution
tKH between capital and labor in the production of value added equals 1. The other two
elasticities of substitution are less often considered. We consider two different values for
each. One possibilityy is to ~sume very littIe opportunity for substitution away from either
materials or energy inputs (which we represent by making both elasticities equal .0001). This
is suggested by the estimates of Berndt and Wood (1979). On the other hand, other studi=,
such as Pindyck and Rote.mberg (1983), suggest some degree of substitutability. We do
not attempt to use their parameter values, as their production function specification is not
consistent with the one we ~sume here. Instead, we have direct 1y estimated the elasticities
of substitution Cvc and CEM under assumptions consistent with our model specification,
using data for 20 two-digit U.S. manuf=turing sectors. This estimation is described in the
Appendix. Based on these estimates, our values for the two elasticities are eEM = 0.18 and
tvc = .69.
As shown in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), the homogeneity assumptions described
above imply that all the aspects of preferenus that matter for our analysis can be d=cribed
by the two parameters CHWand the u. The former is a me~ure of the response of labor supply
to a temporary real wage change, that is sometimes called the ‘intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply” in the labor literature (e.g., Card, 1994). The latter parameter (introdumd
above in our statement of our homogeneity assumptions) corresponds to the elwticity of
consumption growth with respect to chang~ in the real rate of return, holding constant
hours worked in both periods. We assume an intertemporal elasticity of labor supply of 1.3,
and a o of 2. Th-e values follow Wtemberg and Woodford (1992), except that a has b=n
reduced from 3 to 2, for closer conformity with the type of preferences assumed in the real
business cycle literature. 17
170ur finding that the competitive versionof the model does not predict output and real wage declines as
large as those we measure is robust to variation in th~e valu-.
20Other parameters that enter the linearized equilibrium conditions include the steady-
state shares of consumption, investment, and government purchases in private value added,





of the capital stock. All of these quantiti= have direct correlates in
acmunts, and so we calibrate them by assuming that the steady-state
average values for the U.S. over the post war period. Similarly, we use
calibrate the steady-state share of hours hired (or mnscripted by) the
government. The valu~ used here again follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), where they
are discussed in more detail.
Finally, we must specify three parameters relating to the equilibrium behavior of markups.
The first is the steady-state value of the markup itself, p. The value that we use for all of
our imperfectly competitive models is p = 1.2. This implies that for the typical firm, price is
20% higher than marginal cost, while fixed costs account for one sixth of its total costs. As
discussed in htemberg and Woodford (1995), this is well within the range of values for both
market power and increming returns indicated by a number of studies of U.S. industry. The
second is the el~ticity of the function p(X/ Y), evaluated at the steady-state value of X/Y.
This parameter is the one that distinguishes our several imperfectly competitive models. In
the static monopolistic competition model, u in the competitive model, Cu is zero, as the
markup is constant. For the customer market model we let eP equal -1 while we assume that
it equals .15 for the implicit collusion model. (We must assume a positive value less than
.2 in the latter case, for theoretical consistency, as explained in Rotemberg and Woodford,
1992.) The third parameter that must be calibrated is the a appearing in equation (18).
(Note that this parameter matters only in the case of the two variablemarkup models.) Here
we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) in setting a = .9.
When we present our simulations, we report the response of real private value added and
of a real wage to energy price shocks. These simulated response are intended to correspond
to the responses of the time series that are measured by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Thus, we do not report the simulated responses of the ideal value added index u, or of the real
21wage Wt (deflated by the price of output), nor of the wage deflated by the ideal value-added
deflator, The available Commerce Department series differ from these constructs because
there exists a domestic energy sator. Lack of disaggregated data at quarterly intervals
prevents us from removing this sector from our measures of private value added and of the
value-added deflator. We thus report the theoretical responses of variables which, like those
mwured by the Commerce Department, include a domestic energy sector.
We suppose that nominal value added is
~ – pEtEt – ~t + pEtE~
where E: represents domestic energy production. Even though we assume that all inmme
is received by a single representative household, we are free to assume that for accounting
purposes, not all of the ell,ergy inputs used are treated as part of domestic output. Real
value added is instead
~ – pE~Et – ~t + PEOE~
where time O is the base period for the GDP accounts. We furthermore assume that the
fraction of energy inputs that are counted as dome tic production is a constant, i.e., that
E: = sDEt (20)
for some fraction O < sD < 1. This equation is somewhat arbitrary (since we do not here
model the production or pricing decisions of energy producers explicitly). In the simulations
reported, we Set sD = .5, as this represents the approximate share of U.S. oil usage that is
domestically produwd. Note that the specification (20) probably overstates the negative ef-
fects on U.S. energy production of a reduction in U.S. energy demand due to a price increase.
Thus our results probably exaggerate the extent to which the models (both competitive and
imperfectly competitive) predict a reduction of U.S. private value added following such a
shock.
The Corr-pending private value added
value added measure by the real measure.
deflator is defined by dividing the above nominal
Hence the real wage plotted in the figures is not
22zut, but rather
Wt(fi -(1 - sD)p~oEt – M,)
5 Results of Simulations
Figures 2a and 2b display the theoretical responses of output and the real wage respectively,
under the parameter values just discussed. 1s As with all the results we will present, the
response is ca.lculatd for ten quarters following a unit innovation in i~t. The predictions
of four theoretical models are compared: the competitive model, the static monopolistic
competition model, the customer market model, and the implicit collusion model. In these
figur- we also reproduce the ~timated impulse responses (with confidence bands) from
Figures lb and lC for purposa of comparison.
In Figure 2a, we show the predicted response of private value added. For our parameter
values, the competitive model does predict a contraction of output following a positive
innovation in oil prims. However, this contraction is much smaller than is indicated in Figure
lb. Output never falls by more than .06 percent in response to a one percent innovation in
oil prices, which is only on~fourth of the effect that we estimate for quarters 5-7 following
the innovation. Consistent with our heuristic discussion of section 2, the predicted response
for the competitive model lies above the +2s.e. boundary of the confidence band in quarters
4 through 9.
The competitive version of our model also fails to predict that the decline in output
should be significantly greater in the second year than in the quarters immediately follow-
ing the impact. This means that the erosion of the capital stock following an ener~ price
increase do= not substantially increme the predicted output decline. Hence, to a useful ap-
proximation, the predicted effect of an oil shock in the competitive model can be determined
in a framework where the capital stock is treated w given (as in our informal discussion
in section 2). It also suggests that our oversimplified treatment of investment demand, ab-
lswe ~ considered Simulation where we varied the ~umed values of the elwticiti- of substitution
~E~ and ~vc. These variatiom had only a sma~ effect on our results.
23stracting from adjustment costs of any kind, is probably innocuous, at le~t for our analysis
of the competitive model.
Imperfectly competitive models are able to account for a more severe contraction. Simply
=suming a constant markup of 1.2 results in a predicted output decline of -.13 by quarters
5-8, which is twice as large m the one we obtain when p = 1. The implicit collusion model
with p = 1.2 and EU= .15 predicts an even larger decline, more than -.20 from quarter 5
onward. The allowance for endogenous markup variation thus makes the maximum output
contraction 5070larger wit bout any change in the assumed steady-state markup, and makes
it comparable to the estimated decline.
The model with implicit collusion implies larger output declines because it predicts an
incre~e in markups. Markups rise for two reasons. First, the incre=ed price of energy
inputs lowers the return tc capital. In the event of a permanent incre~e in energy pric-,
the equilibrium capital sto”:k would eventually fall u a result, but in the transition period,
real interat rates would be lower than normal. As a result, the present value of future
profits increases. This raises X,/~ and, as a result, markups are higher until the capital
stock adjusts and the real rate returns to its steady-state value.
Second, as is clear from the estimates in Table 1 and as is shown in Figure la, a shock
to energy prims is generally followed by further increases in nominal and real energy prices.
Starting around six quarters after the shock, real energy prices are expected to decline back
to their usual value. Thee expected declines further increase Xt/ Yt at that time. The re~on
is that they imply that sales at that point are low and production costs are high relative to
the values thee variables are expected to have in the future. This means that the temptation
to undercut the implicitly collusive agreement at the risk of a future breakdown in collusion
is unusually low, and the degree of collusion that can be sustained is accordingly unusually
high. Thus this model correctly predicts that the main contraction of output should occur
only in the semnd year following the innovation, since it is at this time, when real energy
prims are not only high but are also expected to decline, that Xt/ Yt is significantly above
24its steady-state value. 19
The customer market model, bycontr~t, predicts alarger immediate contraction than
does the constant-markup model, but less of a contraction in the second year. This is again
because Xt /Y~ rises in the second year, which in this model impli~ markup reductions, as
firms sacrifice current profits to compete more vigorously for their future customer base.
Thus the assumption of customer markets r~ults in a 1=s successful prediction, even com-
pared to the static model of monopolistic competition. Given our parameter values, the
implicit collusion model is the only one whose predicted path for output is always within the
confidence band.
The competitive version of our model has particular difficulty in explaining the observed
decline in real wagm following an oil price increase. In the case of the wage deflated by the
Commerce Department’s value-added deflator (Figure 2b), the competitive model predicts
a very small real wage decline, only a fourth of the ~timated decline in the semnd year.
This decline is entirely due to the dom=tic production energy, which raises the value-added
deflator. As in the previous figure, this model predicts little additional decline in the semnd
year (the decline by the middle of the second year is only about a third larger than the
decline that has occurred by the second quarter following the innovation). The predicted
path of wages is above the +2s.e. boundary of the confidenm band in each of the quarters
4-7.
We find that a higher p alone, regardless of any markup
real wage decline. The static model with a constant markup
variation, helps
p = 1.2 implies
to explain the
that the value
added deflated wage eventually falls by -.06 percent for each percent increase in the price of
oil. This response is inside, but near the edge of, the two standard error confidence band
from the estimated response. The implicit collusion model predicts an even greater decline.
Indeed, in the case of p = 1.2, CM= .15, the predicted decline is even slightly greater than
the estimated response in the second year. Furthermore, this model again predicts a much
lgIn fact, the model predicts that markups actually fall in the quarter of the innovation, preventing any
output decline at all. This is because Xt/Yt falls, due to the expectation of even higher energy prices in the
next severalquarters, despite the first effect mentioned, which raisea X~/Yt even in the first quarter.
25sharper decline in the second year than in the first, so that the predicted path of wages tracks
the estimated path re~onably well. The customer market model, by contrast, predicts the
lowest real wage in the quarter of the innovation, with wages gradually returning to normal
thereafter. Thus the implicit mllusion model again best matches the estimated reponse,
although the predictions of all three imperfectly competitive models are within the confidena
band in this c~e.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that imperfectly competitive models, and in particular a model involving
implicit collusion in the product market, can explain the estimated effect of oil price increases
on output and real wages to a much greater extent than can a stochastic growth model that
assume a perfectly competitive product market. In this conclusion, we briefly discuss how
our theory relates to other simple aggregative models which seek to explain for the output
reductions that followed oil price incre~es.
It is sometimes argued that the recessions following the oil shocks of the 1970’s were
actually due to the tightening of monetary policy on these occasions, rather than an effect
of the higher oil prices themselves. (See, e.g., Darby (1982), Bohi (1989 ).) From this point
of view, our development of a non-monetary model with imperfect competition might seem
to be unnecessary, and our analysis of the competitive case with no allowance either for a
feedback rule for monetary policy or for nominal rigidities misleading. We cannot engage
at this point in a complete discussion of models where money has important effects. But it
does seem to us that models where monetary policy matters cannot avoid our conclusions,
at least without adding considerable complications.
Suppose that over our sample period, oil price incre~es did lead systematically to redud
growth of the money supply over subsequent quarters. Suppose furthermore that one were
to model the real effmts of, changa in monetary policy by postulating imperfectly indexed
nominal wage contracts. In this case the nmclassical labor supply curve would be repla~d
by a perfectly elastic labor supply at a real wage that depends upon the nominal price level
26for non-energy output. In this case, an unexpectedly low money supply, and consequently
an unexpectedly low nominal price level, would r-ult in a contraction of employment and
output. But a condition like (5) would still apply (in the cwe that firms are perfect com-
petitors in their product markets), and this contr~tion would occur only insofar as the rea,l
wage divided by the ideal deflator for value added rose. Thus it is hard to see how the
hypothesis of a coincident monetary tightening muld explain the sharp decline in real wages
that accompania the observed contraction of output.
If one supposes that the real effects of monetary policy are instead due to nominal price
rigidity, one probably has to consider models in which product markets are imperfectly
competitive in the first plain (as in Rotemberg, 1982, and Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987).
This still might seem an alternative to the particular kinds of imperfectly competitive models
developed in this paper. However, as Blinder (1981) and Rotemberg (1983) have observed,
models with sticky prices generally do not imply that oil price increases should have a large
effect on output. Instead, the price stickiness should buffer the economy from such shocks, by
comparison with what would happen in the c~e of flexible prices, sinm markups should be
squeezed at a time of sharply rising nominal marginal costs. Thus such an explanation would
require one to argue not simply that the monetary contraction adds to the contractionary
impact of the oil shock, but that the monetary contraction is really the whole story, sinw
the oil pri~ increase alone would have had little effect on output at all. A large enough
monetary contraction could certainly produce effects upon output and real wages as large as
those we estimate; but it remains unclear why (given the small effect of the oil price shock
upon costs and hence upon inflationary pressures) such a large monetary contractions should
follow oil price increases.
A leading alternative hypothesis, of course, is that the aggregate effects of energy price
increas~ depend crucially upon the fact that such shocks affect different sectors differently.
Among this class of explanations, one must mention the sectoral reallocation model of Hamil-
ton (1988), w well as the sticky-price model of Ball and Mankiw (1992).
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31Appendix I
Production Function Parameter Values
Here we discuss our estimates of the elasticities of substitution cEM and tvc, that are
used in the simulations. We =timate th=e elasticities under the assumption of perfect com-
petition, because we are especially concerned to mrrectly calibrate the mmpetitive model,
the empirical inadequacy of which we document in this paper. The same parameter estimates
are then used in all of the simulations, as we wish to display the consequenms of variations
solely in our assumptions about markup determination. (We note, however, that assumption
of a significant departure from perfect mmpetition ought to change our estimates
and ~vc as well.)
The elasticity cEM is defined as the coefficient in the log-linear approximation
Of EEM
AGEt – AGMi = –(AEt – AMt)/cEM
Here AX denotes demeaned first difference of log X, for each of the variables. (Because
our model implies that both E/M and G~/G~ are stationary variables, such a log-linear
approximation should be valid in the case of sufficiently small equilibrium fluctuations, for
any smooth aggregator. If G is a CES function, of course, the log-linear relationship is
exact, ) Cost minimization by firms then impli= that in equilibrium
ApEt – ApMt = -(AE, – AM,)/c~M (21)
This follows from equilibrium conditions (10) - (11 ) of the text, except that we do not assume
that pM~ = 1 because we analyze sectoral data.
Our data includ= separate observations for materials and services inputs. To ensure that
the estimation yields parameters for our theoretical model, we aggregate these two inputs
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32where AMEt and AMSt denote the growth rates for non-energy inputs that are materials
and services respectively, ApMEt and ApMSt are the growth rates for the corraponding price
indices and sMEt and sMst are the corresponding cost shares. These aggregates are then
used together with AEt and ApEt to estimate (21).
The elasticity ~~c is correspondingly defined as the coefficient in
AQGi – AQvt = -(AGt - Au)/tvG
If we assume that all factors are variable and that the firm is a price taker in each factor
market, then cost minimization again implies
ApGt – Apv~ = (22) –(AGt – AU)/CVG
where price changes ApEt and Apvt are again constructed as Divisia aggregates. However,
we do not observe a rental prim series for capital. Moreover, adjustment costs for capital
(which, admittedly are neglected in our theoretical model) create a wedge between “rest
of capital” series constructed along Jorgensonian lines and the current marginal product of
capital.
An alternative titivating equation is accordingly more convenient. Equation (22) implies
ASGt – Asvt = – (AG, - Au) (1 - :)
where sc~ and svt are the cost shares of intermediate inputs and value added respectively.
Furthermore, under the assumption of perfect competition, we can replace the cost shares
set and Svt by the shares of these input costs in the value of total output, and still write
Svt = 1 – SC*, so that the above equation becomes
1
(1- se,)
— ASGt = (AGt – ‘~)(l -&)
(23)
We use this equation to ~timate CVGusing SCT = SEt + sMt. 20 The quantity growth






sEt + sMt sEt + sMt
20Wcause of the use of cost shar= in the value of total output, e.g., SE1 = ~E~Ei/Yt, rather than shares
in total cost, (23) is correct only under the =umption of perfect competition.
33AK = (1 – s~t)-l[Afi – s~tAG,]
= (1 – s~t - s~t)[A~ – s~,AE, – s~tAM,]
while AMt is constructed as indicated above. 21
We estimate equations (21) and (23) using the KLEMS data for 20 two-digit U.S. man-
ufacturing sectors supplied by BLS Division of Productivity Research. We impose common
elasticities on these 20 sectors to obtain relatively precise estimates that we can use in the
calibration of our symmetric model. We have also examined independent sectoral regres-
sions, and found quali tat ively similar results for most sectors, but with large standard errors
for the coefficient estimat~.
We use the cumulative changa over two years for the growth rates appearing in those
equations. We construct th=e two-year changes by summing the annual change for two
consecutive years, where the annual changa are computed u indicated above. (We have
data for 17 such periods, from 1950/51 through 1987/88.) Two-year growth rates are used
because adjustment of the factor mix to relative pri~ changes appears not to occur entirely
within a single y-r. 22 Since our simulation exercise aims to explore the effects on the
economy that occur during the first two years following an innovation in energy prices, we
seek a medium term elasticity of substitution rather than one that is valid only for the first
four quarters. Indeed, our figures show that the largest effects of energy price increase occur
in the semnd year after the shock.
Finally, we allow for the possibility of stochastic variation in the aggregator functions Q
and G, which would add error terms to equations (21) and (23). Hence, we de-trend (as well
w de-meaning) all of our growth rates, and we estimate (21) and (23) with an instrumental
variable estimator. The instrument is the growth of nominal oil prices over the same two-
year period. As discussed in the text, we regard this w a largely exogenous promss, and so
21 Even though it is the Divisia version of the standard deflator of “value added”, the second of these
equations, is again valid only under the ~umption of perfect competition, The reason is, again, that we
USe cost sharea.
22When we experimented with one year chang~, we found the results much more sensitive to the normal-
ization of the second stage regression because the instrument is much poorer.
34expect it to be unmrrelated with stochastic shocks in the Q and G aggregators, just as we
expect it to be uncorrelated with the labor-augmenting technical shock variable z.
Regression coefficients for regr=sions of the left and right hand side of (21) and (23) on
the contemporaneous nominal oil price changes are given below.
Dependent Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
ApEt – ApMt .259 (.030)
AEt – AMt –.046 (.034]
(1 – s~,)-’As~, .122 (.021)
AG, – AVt –.267 (.044)
We observe that the proposed instrument is a statistically significant predictor of all of
the changes that we are interested in, except AE~ – AM~. Even if this particular low t-
statistic indicates that this is a poor choice of instrument (i.e., one not really correlated with
the shifts we are interested in, and mrrelated with ApEt – ApMt for accidental reasons), then
our use of it can bias our estimate of cEM towards zero.
The first-stage regressions just reported imply IV estimates of tEM = .177 and cvc = .686.
These are the baseline valu~ used
the previous two-year period as an
these results. 23
in the paper. Using the change in the price of oil over
additional instrument has no material consequenus on
‘In general, the use of several instruments implies that the results depend on the side of the equation
that projected against the instruments in the first stage. In the c- of ~EM, the resulting estimate is
0.184 no matter which side of (21) is projected on the instruments. The estimate of ~vc equals 0.659 if
(1 - .s~i)-lAs~t is projected on the instrumnti while it equals 0.670 if AG, - AM is projected. We prefer
the estirnatea with only one instrument because the lagged oil price change doea not result in a significant
coefficient in any of the first-stage regressions, except that for ApEi - ApMl.
35Table 1
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(0.47) (0.08) , ,
Standard errors in parenthesis.
36Table 2
The Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Defined by Values Description
9 7Z7N - 1 0.008 Steady state growth rati (per quarter)
SC e
n 0.697 Share of private consumption expenditure h Y – M
sG 6
m 0.117 Share of government purchases of goods in Y - M
sl (9+6)+ 0.186 Share of private invatment expenditure in Y - M
5D E:/E, 0.5 Share of energy that is domestically produced
6 0.013 Rate of depreciation of capital stock (per quarter)
SE * 0.02 Share of energy costs in total coats
5M y 0.5 Share of materials costs in total costs
SH (l-sE-sM)+ 0.36 Share of labor coats in total costs
SK (1 -SE - SM)* 0.12 Shareof capital cab in total coats
09 0.17 Share of hours hired by the government
r e–~
P 0.014 Steady state real rate of return (per quarter)
or y~~-]-l
6KH -
FKHF 1 El~ticity of substitution between capital and hours
CvG ~ 0.69, 0.0001 Elasticity of substitution between value added and G
EEM
GEGM
GBMG 0.18, 0.0001 Elasticity of substitution between energy and materiti
l/u 0.5 Elasticity of consumption growth with respect to real
return holding hours worked constant
~HW 1,30 Intertemporai elasticity of labor supply
P 1, 1.2 Steady state markup (ratio of price to marginal cost)
CM @
Y/I -1,0,0.15 Elwticity of the markup with respect to X/Y
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